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 Investigative Detention: A Search/ 
Seizure by Any Other Name? 
Hon. Justice Casey Hill 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The common law interpretation of a constable’s duties and powers, 
resulting in a non-legislative ancillary powers doctrine, has more or less 
been broadly criticized, especially insofar as the recognition of an authority 
to investigatively detain a person.1 The judicial importation of the 
Waterfield2 analysis as the foundation for investigative detention sees 
the courts as both the creator of the detention power and definer of its 
contours within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 context 
of arbitrary detention prohibited by section 9 of the Charter. 
While undoubtedly enhancing section 9 Charter standards by 
interpreting the prohibition against arbitrary detention in accordance with 
equality principles animating section 15(1) of the Charter would serve 
to counter both abusive and over-inclusive exercises of investigative 
                                                                                                            

 Superior Court of Justice, Ontario. 
1
 J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention 
After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299; D.M. Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta. 
L. Rev. 905; A. Young, “All Along the Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police Function” 
(1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 329; S. Coughlan, “Search Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed With 
Caution or Full Stop?” (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 49; T. Quigley, “Brief Investigative Detentions: A Critique 
of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935. 
2
 R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164, at 166 (C.A.) requiring the 
Court to consider whether the constable’s conduct was prima facie an unlawful interference with 
the individual’s liberty or property and, if so, whether such conduct falls within the general scope of 
any duty imposed by statute or recognized at common law and whether such conduct, albeit within 
the general scope of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of police powers associated with the 
duty. The Waterfield approach, accepted in R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 
at 115-16 (S.C.C.), was applied by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. 
(3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.) to define a police officer’s power to investigatively detain a suspect. Prior to 
the decision in R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.) recognizing such a 
common law authority, the Simpson case had been adopted in every province: see M. Fairburn, 
“Mann Oh Man — We’ve Only Just Begun” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 171, at 172-73. 
3
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
180 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
detention,4 the choice to settle investigative detention into a section 9 
analysis alone, and not a section 8 search/seizure analysis may, at some 
point, require rethinking. 
In the seminal case of Hunter v. Southam,5 Dickson J. (as he then 
was) observed that the section 8 Charter right textually carrying an 
unreasonableness standard otherwise had no historical, political or 
philosophical context providing any obvious gloss on the guarantee, 
unlike the U.S. Fourth Amendment with its “advantage” of a number of 
articulated prerequisites.6 Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution with a 
guarantee that everyone has a right “to be secure in their persons”,7 and 
no arbitrary detention equivalent, has led to the American courts dealing 
with investigative detention as a search and seizure issue.8 
Early on in our Charter experience, random vehicle stop jurisprudence, 
arbitrary detention scenarios justified by section 1 Charter analysis, and 
therefore not true investigative detention situations based on reasonable 
grounds to suspect, rejected search and seizure scrutiny in favour of 
section 9 Charter analysis.9 
                                                                                                            
4
 D.M. Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an 
Equality-Based Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145. 
5
 Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam 
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. 
6
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 105 (S.C.C.). In Thomson 
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at 449 (S.C.C.), Wilson J. (dissenting in 
the result) described s. 8 of the Charter as “totally lacking in specificity”. Justice La Forest, in R. v. 
Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136, at 153 (S.C.C.), stated that s. 8 “unlike many 
of the other Charter provisions is not qualified by express circumstances, such as, for example, s. 9 
which protects everyone arbitrarily detained or imprisoned”. The Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
7
 U.S. Const., amend. IV. 
8
 Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, at 2403, 2405, 2407 (2007) (“When a police officer 
makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”: 
p. 2403). “[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk 
away, he has ‘seized’ that person”: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 16 (1968); C. Slobogin, “Let’s Not 
Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 
1053, at 1068 (“holding that a stop is not a ‘seizure’ clearly does violence to the normal meaning of 
the word”). 
9
 In R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 398 (S.C.C.), the Court answered 
the following stated constitutional question “No”: “whether the spot check procedure, whereby the 
police officer required the surrender for inspection of the driver’s licence and insurance card, 
infringed the right to be secure against unreasonable search guaranteed by s. 8 of the Charter”  
(at 401 C.C.C.). The Court held, at 410 C.C.C.: 
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With the common law recognition, many would say development, of 
investigative detention, the courts continued to distance the constitutional 
analysis from section 8, staying with the trend established in random/ 
arbitrary detention cases. The vehicle/driver stop jurisprudence relating 
to arbitrariness concerned itself with unfettered discretion, randomness 
and action other than in accord with fixed standards. This is quite different 
than police conduct measured against the standard of targeted necessity 
of “reasonable grounds to suspect” integral to investigative detention.10 
Accordingly, it is not readily apparent why section 9 has occupied the 
entire constitutional field in assessing the investigative detention topic. 
It is evident that the exclusive section 9 approach to detention tends 
to fall down when one considers the situation where, in the decision to 
detain, however defined, the probable cause standard is not met only at 
                                                                                                            
In my opinion, the demand by the police officer, pursuant to the above legislative provisions, 
that the appellant surrender his driver’s licence and insurance card for inspection did not 
constitute a search within the meaning of s. 8 because it did not constitute an intrusion on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy: cf. Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 11 
D.L.R. (4th) 641, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. There is no such intrusion where a person is required 
to produce a licence or permit or other documentary evidence of a status or compliance with 
some legal requirement that is a lawful condition of the exercise of a right or privilege. 
Similarly, in R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22 (S.C.C.), the Court rejected 
(at 45 C.C.C.) a s. 8 Charter application in light of the narrow question before the court: 
Is section 189a(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, as amended by s. 2 of 
the Highway Traffic Amendment Act, 1981 (No. 3), S.O. 1981, c. 72, inconsistent with ss. 7, 
8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the extent that it authorizes the 
random stop of a motor vehicle and its driver by a police officer acting without any 
reasonable grounds or other articulable cause to believe that an offence has been committed, 
when such stop is not part of an organized procedure such as the R.I.D.E. program? 
At p. 30 C.C.C., the court concluded that the case was “governed by the decision in Hufsky”, adding: 
Section 8 might be brought into play in circumstances where the police, in the process of a 
random stop, found in the car marijuana or an item of stolen property. But the police in this 
case did no more than request the appellant’s licence and insurance papers. The appellant 
quickly admitted that his licence was under suspension and as a result he was unable to produce 
these documents. It follows that it cannot be argued that a “seizure” within the meaning of  
s. 8 occurred. The action of the police in this case cannot be regarded as a violation of s. 8 of 
the Charter. 
10
 Here, the distinction is drawn between arbitrary in the sense of “random”, “no criteria 
for selection”, with “absolute discretion” without “criteria, express or implied, which govern its 
exercise” (R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 398, at 407 (S.C.C.)) or indiscriminate, 
capricious, abusive and indiscriminate (R. v. Cayer, [1988] O.J. No. 1120, 66 C.R. (3d) 30, at 43 
(Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1989] 1 S.C.R. vii (S.C.C.))) on the one hand, and, on the other, 
an officer’s mistaken application of a reasonable grounds or reasonable suspicion standard within 
the context of a specific fact situation. It was observed in Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) 
Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 22 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance 
filed after leave to appeal granted [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)) that “articulable cause is used 
only to distinguish between those lawful stops which are random and, therefore, arbitrary and those 
lawful stops which are selective and not arbitrary”. On this view, the selectivity criterion, in effect 
the absence of randomness, distinguishes arbitrary from non-arbitrary. 
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the level of unlawful police conduct, as opposed to the imposition of 
arbitrary detention breaching section 9.11 While a finding of unlawful 
detention is not dispositive of the section 9 Charter issue, such a finding 
nevertheless “will play a central role in determining whether the detention 
is also arbitrary”.12 
Section 8 of the Charter “guarantees a broad and general right to be 
secure from unreasonable search and seizure”.13 While Hunter v. Southam14 
introduced a constitutional framework for section 8 analysis extending 
                                                                                                            
11
 Turning again to the subject raised in footnote 10, the appropriate characterization of 
imperfect application of a selective standard of belief to particular facts, in R. v. Duguay, [1989] 
S.C.J. No. 4, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 5 (S.C.C.), in stating that: “The majority in the Court of Appeal 
for Ontario did not enunciate any principle or rule of law with which we disagree”, the Court 
implicitly approved the dicta of MacKinnon A.C.J.O. ([1995] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 296 
(Ont. C.A.)): 
It cannot be that every unlawful arrest necessarily falls within the words “arbitrarily 
detained”. The grounds upon which an arrest was made may fall “just short” of constituting 
reasonable and probable cause. The person making the arrest may honestly, though mistakenly, 
believe that reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest exist and there may be some basis 
for that belief. In those circumstances the arrest, though subsequently found to be unlawful, 
could not be said to be capricious or arbitrary. On the other hand, the entire absence of 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest could support an inference that no reasonable 
person could have genuinely believed that such grounds existed. In such cases, the conclusion 
would be that the person arrested was arbitrarily detained. Between these two ends of the 
spectrum, shading from white to grey to black, the issue of whether an accused was arbitrarily 
detained will depend, basically, on two considerations: first, the particular facts of the case, 
and secondly, the view taken by the court with respect to the extent of the departure from 
the standard of reasonable and probable grounds and the honesty of the belief and basis for 
the belief in the existence of reasonable and probable grounds on the part of the person 
making the arrest. 
Subsequently, the question as to whether “[u]nlawful arrests may be inherently arbitrary” was left 
as an open question in R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, 112 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 204 (S.C.C.).  
In R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, at paras. 20-21, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), the court 
observed that a lawful search cannot be arbitrary without committing itself to saying every unlawful 
search is arbitrary. That said, the distinction between unlawful detention/arrest and that which is 
properly characterized as arbitrary has been otherwise solidly grounded jurisprudentially: R. v. 
Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 504 (Ont. C.A.); (“it may be that a detention 
although unlawful would not be arbitrary if the officer erroneously believed on reasonable grounds 
that he had an articulable cause. I need not decide whether such a belief could avoid an infringement of 
s. 9 of the Charter”); R. v. Ladouceur, [1987] O.J. No. 333, 35 C.C.C. (3d), 240, at 252 (Ont. C.A.) 
(revd on a different basis [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Cayer, [1988] 
O.J. No. 1120, 66 C.R. (3d) 30, at 43 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1989] 1 S.C.R. vii); R. v. 
Monney, [1997] O.J. No. 4806, 120 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at paras. 88-90 (Ont. C.A.) (revd on a different 
basis [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Willis, [2003] M.J. No. 117, 174 C.C.C. 
(3d) 406, at para. 18 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Tam, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1428, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 196, at 210 
(B.C.C.A.); Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. 
(3d) 1, at paras. 12, 20-21 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance filed after leave to appeal granted 
[1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)). 
12
 R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 488 (Ont. C.A.). 
13
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 107 (S.C.C.). 
14
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
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beyond narrow common law notions of trespass to include reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the Court did not limit section 8 protection to 
reasonable expectation of privacy alone.15 Five years later, the Court 
specifically noted that Hunter’s construct for section 8 “underlined that 
a major, though not necessarily the only, purpose of the constitutional 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 is the 
protection of the privacy of the individual”.16 Again, two decades later, 
with the Supreme Court of Canada observing that in the purposive 
approach to section 8 of the Charter, a guarantee to protect “people, not 
places”, “privacy became the dominant organizing principle”,17 it is evident 
that it is not the exclusive principle. 
Not unlike the reasonableness element of section 8 of the Charter, 
the concept of investigative detention rooted in the Waterfield18 analysis 
requires that the detention be a justifiable use of police power associated 
with an identified police duty. There must be “reasonable necessity or 
justification”.19 Reasonable grounds to suspect the individual’s involvement 
in recent or ongoing criminal activity and that detention is reasonably 
necessary to confirm or dispel that suspicion is the minimum threshold 
for interference with a person’s liberty or freedom of movement.20 A 
detainee may be searched, on reasonable grounds, for a weapon to protect 
                                                                                                            
15
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 108-109 (S.C.C.). At 108, 
the Court linked the s. 8 Charter right to “the public’s interest in being left alone”. This includes 
freedom of movement as “[a]bsent a law to the contrary, individuals are free to do as they please”: 
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). 
16
 R. v. Dyment, [1989] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 253 (S.C.C.). 
17
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at 138-39 (S.C.C.). Section 8 
is also “equally intended to protect people not things”: R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 
C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 259 (S.C.C.). 
18
 R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.). 
19
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 320-21, 324 (S.C.C.) (“The 
overall reasonableness of the decision to detain, however, must further be assessed against all of the 
circumstances, most notably the extent to which the interference with individual liberty is necessary 
to perform the officer’s duty, the liberty interfered with, and the nature and extent of that interference, 
in order to meet the second prong of the Waterfield test.”) As well, the importance of the duty 
discharged by the officer to the public good must be considered: R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 
20 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 121-22 (S.C.C.). Using search and seizure as the conceptual framework for an 
investigative stop or detention recognizing that reasonableness in its common sense and constitutional 
dimensions “is a spacious concept” (A.R. Amar, “Terry and the Future: Terry and Fourth 
Amendment First Principles” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1097, at 1118), it allows for invocation 
of this proportionality principle as noted by C. Slobogin, “Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call For 
Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1053, at 1053, “a search 
or seizure is reasonable if the strength of its justification is roughly proportionate to the level of 
intrusion associated with the police action.” 
20
 Discussed infra at pp. 151-62. 
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the detaining police officer.21 Questions during the detention may, 
depending on the circumstances, amount to a search for and seizure of 
information.22 
The result is pieces of search and seizure analysis grafted onto an 
exclusive section 9 Charter analysis relating to the detention itself — a 
stop and restraint of the person subjected to investigative detention whether 
by physical or psychological compulsion to surrender liberty and freedom 
of movement. 
We have experience with the seizure of persons by warrants of arrest, 
Feeney23 warrants, or section 487.01(1) Criminal Code24 general warrants. 
Such measures involve governmental interference with physical and 
personal autonomy. Charter rights are to be interpreted generously, not 
in a narrow or legalistic fashion.25 If questioning can constitute a search, 
and observations by the police a seizure, then it is no stretch to consider 
the stop and restraint of movement of an individual as a warrantless 
seizure. Although, as said, reasonable expectation of privacy is not a 
sine qua non for section 8 Charter protection, the circumstances of  
an investigative detention may implicate intrusion upon a reasonable 
expectation of privacy as the police are able to take advantage of the 
opportunity to undertake precise scrutiny of a pedestrian’s person,  
clothes and carried possessions, or the interior of a stopped vehicle, or to 
question a detainee who, often perceiving compulsion to respond, answers 
questions in a context which would not meet the section 8 criteria for a 
valid and informed consent search. 
Before rushing to subsume unlawful detention (i.e., subjectively and 
in good faith, an officer believes she has reasonable suspicion to detain 
but is mistaken, falling just short on the objective aspect of the test) into 
section 9 arbitrariness, a standard of constitutional departure including 
elevated police misconduct such as randomness, capriciousness, improper 
purpose, and the like, we should pause and take a last opportunity, 
assuming it still exists, to assess the issue in section 8 Charter terms. 
The decision to opt for a paradigm focusing on the arbitrariness of the 
stop and restraint, as opposed to the reasonableness of the seizure of  
the individual, holds significant implications, not the least of which is 
                                                                                                            
21
 Discussed infra at pp. 163-68. 
22
 Discussed infra at pp. 168-75. 
23
 R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.). 
24
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
25
 R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 253 (S.C.C.). 
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that the onus resides with the accused to demonstrate in the section 9 
context that she or he was arbitrarily detained, whereas consideration of 
investigative detention as a warrantless seizure/search would flip the burden 
to the Crown to establish compliance with section 8 Charter principles.26 
In any event, whether or not described as pure section 8 Charter issues, 
a number of search/seizure-like issues arising in investigative detention 
cases warrant further discussion. 
II. REASONABLE GROUNDS TO SUSPECT… 
Given that the exercise of police powers in furtherance of public 
safety is not unrestrained in the sense of being entirely at the whim of 
state agents regardless of the circumstances, government interference 
with an individual’s liberty must be premised on a standard of belief. A 
standard is effectively a judicially established cost/benefit policy governing 
the generic factual scenario, including consideration of the nature and 
degree of interference with civil rights and the public interest objective of 
the restraint. 
Standards of belief — requisite degrees of probability — have 
generally been accepted by the courts as incapable of precise definition 
and more often than not are described in terms of what they are not. 
Justice La Forest observed as to reasonable and probable grounds: 
 Let me first say something about the vagueness of the proposed 
test of “reasonable and probable cause” and the consequential danger 
of giving the police power to enter into a private dwelling on that 
basis. The expression, no doubt, comprises something more than mere 
surmise, but determining with any useful measure of precision what it 
means beyond that poses rather intractable problems both for the police 
and the courts. . . . I have found nothing in the cases or in learned 
commentaries that gives much assistance in giving more precision to 
the concept, the situations being so various. Because of the vagueness 
of the discretion it gives a police officer, that discretion is virtually 
uncontrollable.27 
                                                                                                            
26
 Such a s. 8 Charter approach would likely impact on racial profiling litigation as, in the 
s. 9 context, “[p]lacing an onus on the accused to prove the unstated subjective motivations of a 
police officer explains why few, if any, racial profiling cases have been challenged and exposed in court”: 
D.M. Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality-Based 
Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2004) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145, at para. 75. 
27
 R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 25-26 (S.C.C.) (dissenting in the 
result). 
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On the other hand, L’Heureux-Dubé J. viewed the standard as a 
practical, non-technical threshold which, “at its core . . . is a ‘common 
sense’ concept”.28 
“Reasonableness” comprehends a requirement of probability.29 
Reasonable grounds to believe have been equated to the American Fourth 
Amendment standard of “probable cause”.30 The standard “to be met  
in order to establish reasonable grounds for a search is ‘reasonable 
probability’”.31 Put somewhat differently, reasonable grounds to believe, 
the point where the state’s interest in detecting crime begins to prevail 
over the individual’s interest in being left alone, is “where credibly-
based probability replaces suspicion”.32 The standard of reasonable grounds 
to believe “is not to be equated with proof beyond a reasonable doubt or 
a prima facie case. . . . The standard to be met is one of reasonable 
probability”.33 
The Hunter v. Southam34 standard of reasonable grounds is accepted 
as “the minimum standard” for constitutional compliance where the 
state’s interest is “law enforcement”.35 As such, belief that evidence may 
be uncovered in a search, as a general rule, impermissibly dilutes that 
standard to the mere “possibility of finding evidence”.36 
Consensus exists that conjecture or a hunch cannot generally support 
the legitimate exercise of a police power interfering with individual liberty. 
                                                                                                            
28
 R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 124 (S.C.C.) (dissenting 
in the result) (“There are no absolute magic words necessary to define when this standard has been 
reached”). 
29
 Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510, at 532 (S.C.C.). 
30
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114 (S.C.C.). 
31
 Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510, at 532 (S.C.C.). This is not a 
standard of “certainty”: R. v. Mouland, [2007] S.J. No. 532, 2007 SKCA 105, at para. 22 (Sask. C.A.). 
32
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114-15 (S.C.C.). 
33
 R. v. Debot, [1986] O.J. No. 994, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 219 (Ont. C.A.) (affd [1989] 
S.C.J. No. 118, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 198, 213 (S.C.C.)). C. Slobogin, “Let’s Not Bury Terry: A 
Call For Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1053, at 1082, 
assuming the probable cause standard equates to a minimum “more likely than not” threshold, states: 
“But can we be serious about that definition? Are we really willing to allow police to arrest 
someone when there is a 50% chance they have the wrong person?” 
34
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
35
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 115 (S.C.C.). 
36
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114 (S.C.C.). Baron v. 
Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510, at 532-33 (S.C.C.): “This court established in 
Hunter that a standard of credibly based probability rather than mere suspicion should be applied in 
determining when an individual’s interest in privacy is subordinate to the needs of law enforcement 
. . . the controlling standard is credibly-based probability, not mere possibility.” 
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“A ‘hunch’ based entirely on intuition gained by experience cannot 
suffice, no matter how accurate that ‘hunch’ might prove to be.”37 
The relevant factual baseline for an investigative detention is that 
available at the time of detention, a “front-end” determination and not 
“[l]ater acquired information”.38 
The defined standard for a police officer to effect an investigative 
detention is “reasonable grounds to suspect” that in all the circumstances 
a person “is connected to a particular crime and that such a detention is 
necessary”.39 This equates to the “articulable cause” standard of American 
search and seizure jurisprudence.40 The accepted standard then is 
“reasonable suspicion” — a state of belief grounded in objectively 
discernible facts41 and “clearly a threshold somewhat lower than the 
reasonable and probable grounds required for lawful arrest”,42 a less 
demanding standard, though more than “unparticularized suspicion or 
‘hunch’”.43 The precise contours of the standard, imported from the U.S. 
                                                                                                            
37
 R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Mann, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 30 (S.C.C.). 
38
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 34 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cooper, 
[2005] N.S.J. No. 102, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 162, at paras. 29, 42 (N.S.C.A.); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 
266, at 271 (2000); A.S. Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and Growing 
Judicial Deference to Police Judgment” (2001) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198, at 202 (danger in some cases of 
“police shap[ing] their testimony after an ex post facto consideration of the incident”). 
39
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 45 (S.C.C.). 
40
 R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) per Major J. 
in dissent on a different point; R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 503 (Ont. C.A.). 
41
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 324-25 (S.C.C.). 
42
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 322 (S.C.C.); R. v. Simpson, 
[1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.), at 501 (“particularized suspicion”), 502 
(“reasonable suspicion of crime”); a standard lower than the standard set by s. 495(1) of the Code 
for an arrest: R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 27, 45 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Cooper, [2005] N.S.J. No. 102, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 162, at 172 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Greaves, [2004] 
B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305, at para. 41 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C.A. 
No. 522 (S.C.C.)); C. Slobogin, “Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call For Rejuvenation of the Proportionality 
Principle” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1053, at 1082, citing C.M.A. McCauliff, “Burdens of Proof: 
Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?” (1982), 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293,  
at 1327-28 that a surveyed group of American federal judges considered the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard to carry about a 30 per cent level of certainty, questions whether we should be “willing to 
subject two innocent people” to restraint of liberty “to nab one bad actor”. 
43
 U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, at 7 (1989); R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. 
(3d) 481, at 491 (Ont. C.A.), per Weiler J.A. otherwise in dissent; R. v. Byfield, [2005] O.J. No. 228, 
193 C.C.C. (3d) 139, at 147 (Ont. C.A.) (not “hunches, speculation and guesses”). See also R. v. Simpson, 
[1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501 (Ont. C.A.): “Terms like ‘articulable reasons’ and 
‘founded suspicion’ are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of 
the myriad factual situations that arise.” 
188 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Terry44 stop and frisk experience, is not made clearer by resort to the 
American cases.45 
What is apparent is that the standard of reasonable grounds to suspect 
is the “possibility” threshold subjected to criticism in Hunter v. Southam46 
and Baron v. Canada47 during the establishment of the reasonable and 
probable grounds standard as the minimum constitutional standard for 
search and seizure in furtherance of law enforcement interests. The 
reasonable grounds to suspect standard is a minimal level of belief 
which does not rule out “the possibility of innocent conduct”48 or “other 
reasonable possibilities”.49 Indeed, it has been observed “that a reasonable 
suspicion will much more frequently be wrong than will reasonable and 
probable grounds”.50 
Critics of investigative detention imposable on a reasonable suspicion 
threshold argue that such a malleable and ambiguous standard is a 
prescription for pretextual stops in high crime areas, detention based on 
lack of cooperation, or stops employing race and stereotyping as proxies 
for criminality. The risks to liberty of adoption of a significantly depressed 
standard of belief are not necessarily offset by the judicial interpretive 
toolkit accompanying the “reasonable grounds to suspect” threshold, which 
kit includes the following: 
(1) The totality of the circumstances, the content and reliability of the 
information acquired by the officer, must be assessed in determining 
                                                                                                            
44
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
45
 U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, at 417 (1981) (reasonable suspicion is not a “finely-tuned 
standard”); U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, at 274 (2002) (“concept of reasonable suspicion is 
somewhat abstract”; “we have deliberately avoided reducing it to ‘a neat set of legal rules’”); U.S. 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, at 7 (1989) (articulable cause amounts to a level of suspicion “fall[ing] 
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of evidence standard”).  
46
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
47
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510 (S.C.C.). 
48
 U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, at 277 (2002). 
49
 U.S. v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, at 593 (5th Cir. 2004). 
50
 T. Quigley, “Brief Investigative Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 
Alta. L. Rev. 935, at para. 20. In R. v. Lal, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446, 130 C.C.C. (3d) 413, at 423 
(B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.)), the Court observed that, 
“Since the standard for reasonable suspicion is less demanding than that for reasonable belief it can 
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show reasonable belief.” Similarly, 
in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, at 330 (1990), the Court observed that 
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense 
that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or 
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable 
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable 
cause. 
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whether reasonable suspicion exists — a constellation of objectively 
discernible facts together with rational inferences from those facts 
— with a preference for scrutiny of the whole picture; each fact or 
indicator ought not to be separated out for isolated assessment where 
the police are involved in fluid and fast-paced law enforcement, 
making quick decisions on limited information.51 
(2) Avoidance of second-guessing the police and the perspective of 
hindsight contribute to immunizing the exercise of discretion from 
critical review.52 
                                                                                                            
51
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 34, 45 (S.C.C.) (“the 
totality of the circumstances. . . informing the officer’s suspicion”; “in all the circumstances”); R. v. 
Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308; 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501 (S.C.C.) (assessment based “upon all of 
the circumstances”); R. v. Lal, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446, 130 C.C.C. (3d) 413, at 423 (B.C.C.A.) 
(leave to appeal refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.)) (“Reasonable suspicion like reasonable 
belief is dependent on both the content of the information provided to the police and its degree of 
reliability”); U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, at 273-74, 277 (2002) (reasonable suspicion determination 
to be made on “totality of the circumstances” approach; “divide-and-conquer analysis” of separating 
out individual factors inappropriate even though “each of these factors alone is susceptible to 
innocent explanation . . . ”); R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at paras. 
15, 18 (Ont. C.A.) per Weiler J.A. (in dissent in the result) (potentially “neutral indicators”, though 
each “susceptible of innocent explanation”, the “totality of circumstances” may “be suspicious”);  
R. v. Tran, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2341, 2007 BCCA 491, at paras. 15, 17 (B.C.C.A.) (factors to be 
considered “cumulatively” not looking at each item of evidence viewed “separately”); R. v. Schrenk, 
[2007] M.J. No. 154, 2007 MBQB 93, at para. 51 (Man. Q.B.) (“sometimes facts which on their own 
have little or no significance, when combined with other events or facts, create a situation from 
which reasonable inferences may be drawn. It is equally so, however, that ‘zero plus zero equals zero’, 
so a long list of only potentially suspicious facts does not create reasonable grounds to suspect an 
individual was connected to a crime”); R. v. Gurr, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1480, 2007 BCSC 979,  
at para. 23 (B.C.S.C.) (accused argued “there could have been an innocent explanation for all of 
these things”; held: “That . . . is not the test”); R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 
449, at para. 53 (S.C.C.) per Abella J. (“responding to legitimate safety concerns in a ‘fast-paced’ 
situation”) and at paras. 97, 99, 122 per Binnie J. (“The law requires individual police officers to 
make difficult decisions under fast-moving conditions”; “The tip was hot. Quick police action promised 
success”; “The police do not always have the advantage of the full story from a 911 caller”); R. v. Mann, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 318 (S.C.C.) (“[P]olice officers must be empowered 
to respond quickly, effectively, and flexibly to the diversity of encounters daily on the front lines of 
policing”). 
52
 R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 26-27 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J. 
in dissent in the result (“The police’s job of maintaining the peace and enforcing the criminal law is 
difficult enough without fearing being regularly ‘second-guessed’ about every mistake of judgment 
in such circumstances”); Crampton v. Walton, [2005] A.J. No. 178, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 221 
(Alta. C.A.) (immediate decision of a police officer made in the course of duty not generally  
assessed through “the lens of hindsight”); R. v. White, [2007] O.J. No. 1605, 2007 ONCA 318,  
at para. 54 (Ont. C.A.) (“. . . he found himself in a dangerous and potentially volatile situation. In 
the circumstances, he had little time to reflect. He had to make a split second decision; a moment’s 
hesitation could have put his life and that of his partner in peril. Courts should keep this in mind 
when assessing the conduct of officers in the field. When it comes to officer safety and preserving 
the integrity of their investigation, police officers should be given a good deal of leeway and second 
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(3) Although the standard has both the subjective suspicion of the police 
officer and, as a control or check, an objective component of 
reasonable suspicion of one placed in the circumstances of the 
officer,53 the subjective and objective aspects of the threshold belief 
include consideration of the training and experience of the detaining 
officer.54 
                                                                                                            
guessing should be avoided”); Webster v. Edmonton (City) Police Service, [2007] A.J. No. 71, 2007 
ABCA 23, at paras. 28-29 (Alta. C.A.) (court’s “inappropriate use of hindsight”); R. v. Aguirre, 
[2006] O.J. No. 5071, at para. 259 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“Although the police ‘usually act deliberately and 
not accidentally’ (R. v. Brown, at para. 63), ‘[a] certain amount of latitude is permitted to police 
officers who are under a duty to act and must often react in difficult and exigent circumstances’: R. 
v. Asante-Mensah (Ont. C.A.) [[2001] O.J. No. 3819, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.)], at p. 510 
[affd [2003] S.C.J. No. 38, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.)]. Unlike search warrant applications, in an 
arrest situation, ‘the dynamics at play . . . are very different’ as the police must make an arrest 
decision ‘based on available information which is often less than exact or complete’: R. v. Polashek 
(1999), 134 C.C.C. (3d) 187 (Ont. C.A.) at pp. 197-8. In street policing, police officers do not have 
the ‘luxury of waiting and synthesizing all information available to them’ (R. v. Mollazadeh, 
[[2006] B.C.J. No. 181, 2006 BCCA 35 (B.C.C.A.)] at paras. 9-10) as ‘on the spot’ decisions are 
made without ‘time for careful reflection’: R. v. Golub [[1997] O.J. No. 3097, 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 
(Ont. C.A.)], at p. 211 [leave to appeal refused, [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 571, [1998] 1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.)]”); 
U.S. v. Winston, 444 F.3d 115, at 119-21 (1st Cir. 2006) (“. . . the experienced perceptions of law 
enforcement agents deserve deference and constitute a factor in our reasonable suspicion analysis”; 
“. . . we are not here to second guess the agents . . .”). 
53
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 27, 34 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 504 (Ont. C.A.) (“The objectivity of the 
assessment is critical”). 
54
 R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at 149 (S.C.C.) per Sopinka J. 
(“The objective test . . . is whether a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the officer, would 
have believed . . .”) and per L’Heureux-Dubé J. dissenting in the result at 183 (“should incorporate 
the experience of the officer”); U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, at 418 (1981) (“the evidence . . . must 
be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed 
in the field of law enforcement”); U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, at 273-74, 277 (2002) (allows 
officers to draw on their own experience and training to make inferences from and deductions about 
the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person”; due 
weight to be given to factual inferences drawn by local law enforcement officers); Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, at 372 (1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 30 (1968), “where a 
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot…”); R. v. Juan, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1402, 222 C.C.C. 
(3d) 289, at para. 19 (B.C.C.A.) (“the ‘reasonable person’ is presumed to have the knowledge and 
experience . . . of a knowledgeable and experienced police officer”); R. v. Tran, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2341, 
2007 BCCA 491, at para. 12 (B.C.C.A.) (experience of police officers relevant and relates to 
existence of objective grounds); R. v. Mouland, [2007] S.J. No. 532, at paras. 26-27 (Sask. C.A.) 
(officers entitled to act on their “training and experience”); R. v. Ingle, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2024, 
2007 BCCA 445, at para. 53 (B.C.C.A.) (“based on his extensive experience in investigating 
marihuana cases”); R. v. Iraheta, [2007] O.J. No. 2205, at paras. 16, 23 (Ont. S.C.J.) (officer relying on 
past “experience, knowledge and training”); R. v. Quillian, [1991] A.J. No. 1211, 122 A.R. 131, at 
para. 56 (Alta. Q.B.) (“I am of the opinion that the reasonable person must be deemed to have the 
same level of experience as the police officer whose actions are being scrutinized. If this were not so, 
then the reasonable man would have no standard or guideline against which to measure the 
reasonableness of the officer’s belief.”); R. v. Grotheim, [2001] S.J. No. 694, 2001 SKCA 116,  
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(4) There is no sound reason for invalidating an otherwise proper stop 
because the police used the opportunity afforded by that stop to 
further some other legitimate interest.55 
These interpretive guidelines do not relieve the court of its obligation 
to ascertain whether, objectively viewed, there existed articulable and 
logically probative factors meeting the requisite standard of belief.  
Deference to law enforcement has its boundaries.56 An officer’s experience 
and assessment of an ongoing situation “must not become a substitute 
for a court’s independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the officer’s 
decision and should not serve as a basis for rubber stamping the 
officer’s conclusion”.57 
Many have voiced concern that despite the existence of an objective 
component,58 the judicial creation of a police power to detain for 
investigative purposes on a low-level standard of belief holds implications 
for racial profiling or at least a disproportionate impact on visible 
minorities.59 On occasion, the issue of race is inextricably bound up in a 
                                                                                                            
at para. 30 (Sask. C.A.) (“Whether such grounds in fact exist depends upon whether a reasonable 
person, standing in the shoes of the police officer, would have believed that there were reasonable 
and probable grounds for making an arrest”); R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373, 214 C.C.C. 
(3d) 547, at 559 (Alta. C.A.) (“a judge is entitled to consider a police officer’s training and 
experience in determining objective reasonableness . . . What may appear to be innocent objects to 
the general public may have a very different meaning to an officer experienced in drug operations”);  
R. v. Lawes, [2007] O.J. No. 50, 2007 ONCA 10, at para. 4 (Ont. C.A.) (“An objective assessment 
will include the dynamics within which the police officer acted, and his or her experience”); R. v. 
Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. 
No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 19 (Ont. C.A.) (dissent) (constable could take into account 
training received on drug interdiction courses). 
55
 Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. 
(3d) 1, at 17 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance filed after leave to appeal granted [1999] 
S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)). 
56
 A.S. Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and Growing Judicial Deference 
to Police Judgment” (2001) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198, at 202; T. Maclin, “Terry and Race: Terry v. Ohio’s 
Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1271, 
at 1309 (“When a police suspicion test is substituted for the probable cause standard, the judicial 
tendency to defer to police intuition and experience is exacerbated”). 
57
 L.R. Katz, “Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View” (2004) 74 Miss. L.J. 423,  
at 491. 
58
 R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501-502 (Ont. C.A.) (objective 
standard “serves to avoid indiscriminate and discriminatory exercises of the police power” or a 
purely subjective assessment that “can too easily mask discriminatory conduct based on such 
irrelevant factors as the detainee’s . . . colour . . . ethnic origin”). 
59
 J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention 
After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 304 (“the reality that abuses of this new power will have 
a disproportionate impact on visible minorities went unmentioned” in Mann in its approval of 
investigative detentions which are “low-visibility encounters”) and 313-14 (footnotes omitted)  
(“. . . a mounting body of empirical evidence would now seem to suggest, when these powers are 
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abused, the effect is felt disproportionately by visible minorities, in particular African and Aboriginal 
Canadians”); R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 30 (S.C.C.) per La Forest J. 
dissenting (grant of a vague discretion to police most likely to be used “against the disadvantaged” 
including “on the poor and on marginal, minority groups”); A. Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause — 
Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327, at 335 (“In recent years, 
the police practice of profiling has become increasingly prevalent and linked to investigative 
detentions”); D. Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 905; B.L. Berger, 
“Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 58; D.M. Tanovich, “The Colourless World 
of Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; D.A. Harris, “Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized 
Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under 
Terry v. Ohio” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 975; F.R. Cooper, “Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s 
‘Seasaw Effect’” (2003) 56 Okla. L. Rev. 833; T.R. Calderon, “Race-Based Policing from Terry to 
Wardlow: Steps Down the Totalitarian Path” (2000) 44 How. L.J. 73; M. Carpiniello, “Striking A 
Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard For ‘Location Plus Evasion’ Terry Stops” 
(2001) 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 355; R. v. Young, [2007] O.J. No. 102, 84 O.R. (3d) 437 (Ont. C.J.) (in 
context of investigation detention analysis, the Court noting at 441, “the seemingly endless 
confrontations between police officers and (usually) poor young males in this city [Toronto] . . .” 
(further footnoting that the defendant was an Afro-Canadian). In dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow,  
528 U.S. 119 (2000), a stop and frisk case, Stevens J., writing for himself and three others, stated at 
129, 132-33: 
In short, there are unquestionably circumstances in which a person’s flight is suspicious, 
and undeniably instances in which a person runs for entirely innocent reasons.3 
. . . . . 
3 Compare, e.g. Proverbs 28:1 (“The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the 
righteous are as bold as a lion” with Proverbs 22:3 (“A shrewd man sees trouble coming 
and lies low; the simple walk into it and pay the penalty”). 
I have rejected reliance on the former proverb in the past, because its “ivory 
towered analysis of the real world” fails to account for the experiences of many citizens 
of this country, particularly those who are minorities. See California v. Hodari D., 499 
U.S. 621, 630, n. 4, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) Stevens J., dissenting). 
That this pithy expression fails to capture the total reality of our world, however, does 
not mean it is inaccurate in all instances. 
. . . . . 
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, 
there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without 
justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any 
criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked 
flight is neither “aberrant” nor “abnormal.”8 Moreover, these concerns and fears are known 
to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforcement investigations into 
their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is 
too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as 
inconclusive or insufficient. [footnotes omitted except footnote 8] 
. . . . . 
8 Many stops never lead to an arrest, which further exacerbates the perceptions of 
discrimination felt by racial minorities and people living in high crime areas. See 
Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. Times Magazine, June 20, 1999, p. 85 
(reporting that in 2-year period, New York City Police Department Street Crimes Unit 
made 45,000 stops, only 9,500, or 20%, of which resulted in arrest); Casimir, supra, n. 7 
(reporting that in 1997, New York City’s Street Crimes Unit conducted 27,061 stop-
and-frisks, only 4,647 of which, 17%, resulted in arrest). Even if these data were race 
neutral, they would still indicate that society as a whole is paying a significant cost in 
infringement on liberty by these virtually random stops. 
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report to the police of criminal conduct and as such forms a necessarily 
integral feature of identifying the person alleged to have been involved, 
or to be involved, in criminal activity.60 On other occasions, the role of 
race in effecting an investigative detention is more questionable.61 
Where the authorities receive a report of sufficient reliability62 
                                                                                                            
60
 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paras. 44, 46, 47 (S.C.C.) 
per Abella J. (police told suspects were black males and occupants of stopped vehicle “matched the 
race of the suspects mentioned in the 911 call”; they “matched the general description they had”; 
“the police would not have had reasonable grounds for the continued detention of non -white 
occupants”) and at paras. 81, 122, 124 per Binnie J. (after the stop of the vehicle, “the only relevant 
description of the individuals from the 911 call was that they were all black”; “the 911 caller must 
be presumed to be less error prone in dealing with a person’s appearance” than in dealing with 
vehicle recognition; “if the occupants of the stopped car had been female and Asiatic” then a 
tailored roadblock would let them pass; “Farmer, being black, fit the general description given by 
the 911 caller”); R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 315 (S.C.C.) (police 
looking for a suspect whose description included that he was an Aboriginal Canadian); R. v. 
Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, at paras. 60, 180 (Ont. S.C.J.) (police seeking suspect whose 
description included that he was of olive complexion and Spanish appearance). 
61
 R. v. Aslam, [2006] B.C.J. No. 3152, 2006 BCCA 551, at para. 2 (B.C.C.A.) (in routine 
licence plate check, officers determined vehicle “registered to a person with an Asian name” and, 
because the driver “appeared to be East Indian”, the police stopped the van to see if it was stolen). 
62
 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 34 (S.C.C.) (police 
“should be entitled to rely” on information from a 911 call); and para. 122 (police do not always 
have “the full story from a 911 caller”); R. v. Plummer, [2007] O.J. No. 2818, at paras. 43-48, 55-56, 
148-52 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“Officer Safety Alert” used by officer as part of grounds to detain re weapon 
investigation though unaware of reliability of information behind Alert); R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J. 
No. 376, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 489, 493 (Ont. C.A.) (re anonymous tipster’s information, the 
“totality of the circumstances” must be considered — “The totality of circumstances encompasses 
factors which are relevant either to the accuracy of the specific information supplied by the tipster 
or the reliability of the tipster as a source of information for the police”; here, although Lewis was 
scheduled to fly to Edmonton on a Canada 3000 flight at the time indicated and he matched the 
description given by the caller (“a clean shaven, heavy-set black man named Keith Lewis” [at 485]) 
and was travelling with a young child as reported, the absence of confirmation of details other than 
which describe innocent and commonplace conduct held to be insufficient to constitute reasonable 
grounds for an arrest or search but amounting to “articulable cause to briefly detain [Lewis] to 
investigate the allegations made by the tipster” [at 493]); but see Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,  
at 272-73 (anonymous tip to police that young black male at a particular bus stop wearing a plaid 
shirt was carrying a gun; on arrival at the bus stop, three black males observed with one wearing a 
plaid shirt; frisk of suspect revealed gun in his pocket; held: no reasonable suspicion to justify stop 
and frisk; held [at 271-73]: 
The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information and therefore left 
the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility. That the allegation 
about the gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, 
had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct . . . 
. . . . . 
Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal 
activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion 
of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. Cf. 4 W. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 9.4(h), p. 213 (3d ed. 1996) (distinguishing reliability as to identification, 
which is often important in other criminal law contexts, from reliability as to the likelihood 
of criminal activity, which is central in anonymous-tip cases). 
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describing a person who is, or has recently been, involved in criminal 
activity, the police search for someone resembling the broadcast description. 
The case law, consistent with the minimal degree of probability for 
investigative detention, as currently contoured, does not require extensive 
details63 or an identical match64 before lawful detention can be effected. 
Where the police do not operate from a reported description but happen 
upon an individual they suspect of involvement in criminality, the 
indicators or circumstantial factors subjectively employed to support that 
                                                                                                            
A second major argument advanced by Florida and the United States as amicus is, in 
essence, that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a “firearm exception.” 
Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if 
the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this position. 
Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions. 
Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed criminals pose to public safety; Terry’s 
rule, which permits protective police searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather 
than demanding that officers meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds to this 
very concern. See 392 U.S. at 30. But an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability 
analysis would rove too far. Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass 
another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person 
simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target’s unlawful carriage of a 
gun. Nor could one securely confine such an exception to allegations involving firearms. 
Several Courts of Appeals have held it per se foreseeable for people carrying significant 
amounts of illegal drugs to be carrying guns as well. See, e.g., United States v. Sakyi, 160  
F. ed 164, 169 (CA4 1998); United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1490, n. 20 (CA5 1995); 
United States v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949, 959 (CA6 1994); United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d 
217, 219 (CA8 1992). If police officers may properly conduct Terry frisks on the basis of 
bare-boned tips about guns, it would be reasonable to maintain under the above-cited 
decisions that the police should similarly have discretion to frisk based on bare-boned tips 
about narcotics. As we clarified when we made indicia of reliability critical in Adams and 
White, the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied. 
63
 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) (black males); R. v. 
Batzer, [2005] O.J. No. 3929, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 18, 19 (suspects “answered 
the very general description given by the caller”). 
64
 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 37 (S.C.C.) (persons 
detained need not match “exactly” the information provided); R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, 
at para. 174 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“A suspect’s appearance need not, of course, be a perfect match before 
the police act: R. v. Mollazadeh, [2006] B.C.J. No. 181 (C.A.) at paras. 9-10; R. v. Greaves (2004), 
189 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (B.C.C.A.) at pp. 323-4 (leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 522); R. v. 
Hall [[1995] O.J. No. 544, 22 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.)] at para. 39; R. v. Singh (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 38 
(Ont. C.A.) at p. 43”); R. v. Gurr, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1480, 2007 BCSC 979, at para. 22 (B.C.S.C.) 
(person “closely resembling” the accused). This is, in part, a reflection of a reality that “reasonable 
suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that 
required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from 
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause”: Alabama v. White,  
496 U.S. 325, at 330 (1990). 
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belief are not always cogently and objectively probative65 except in 
combination with other known facts. 
The broad authority of peace officers to randomly stop vehicles on 
roadways to determine driver and vehicle compliance with relevant 
regulatory requirements66 cannot be used as a pretext to stop vehicles 
and their occupants to further an ongoing criminal investigation through 
questioning of an occupant or observations of the vehicle interior.67 The 
stop must be a legitimate highway traffic legislation stop or, at the outset, 
meet the criteria set for a Mann68 investigative detention. 
Everyone in a motor vehicle is not by virtue of occupancy in personal, 
joint or constructive possession69 of the auto or its contents. Much the same 
may be said about two or more pedestrians walking together in terms of 
an item, a knapsack or something in one person’s hand or pocket. The 
enforcement approach frequently tends toward detention of the collective 
as the police seek identification from everyone in their effort to sort  
out who might be involved in illegal activity. The circumstances may 
reasonably warrant such suspicion and detention,70 but the justification is 
                                                                                                            
65
 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) (Clayton stared straight 
ahead, made no eye contact, looked nervous and swayed from side to side); Minnesota v. Dickerson,  
508 U.S. 366 (1993) (suspect made eye contact, abruptly halted, and walked in opposite direction); 
R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at paras. 72, 74 (Ont. C.A.) (fast food, 
duffel bags, roadmap, cell phones, pagers in car not amounting to reliable indicators identifying a 
drug courier profile: “Given the neutrality and apparent unreliability of these indicators” they could 
not amount to reasonable grounds for detention); R. v. Mouland, [2007] S.J. No. 532, at paras. 25, 27 
(Sask. C.A.) (officer may consider that vehicle originated out-of-province and “unusual circumstance” 
that driver not the registered owner); R. v. Cox, [1999], 132 C.C.C. (3d) 256, at para. 12 (N.B.C.A.) 
(“The elements of the smuggler’s profile here are no more than hunches, speculation and guesses 
that do not qualify as ‘objectively discernible facts”); U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (driver’s 
posture was stiff and rigid and he did not look at the cruiser as he drove by or offer a “friendly 
wave” and, as the officer followed the vehicle, the three children in the back waved in an abnormal 
pattern as though instructed to do so); R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 547 
(Alta. C.A.) (suspect biting his lip, bus ticket purchased at the last minute with cash, visibly 
trembling and stammering speech). 
66
 R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22, at 37-45 (S.C.C.). 
67
 R. v. Doell, [2007] S.J. No. 264, 221 C.C.C. (3d) 336, at paras. 20-25, 28 (Sask. C.A.); 
R. v. Houben, [2006] S.J. No. 715, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 519, at 541 (Sask. C.A.). 
68
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.). 
69
 R. v. Terrence, [1983] S.C.J. No. 28, 4 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 198 (S.C.C.) (not merely 
knowledge of the unlawful character of an object but some measure of control necessary on the part 
of a passenger to establish constructive possession as defined in s. 3(b) of the Code). 
70
 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) (passenger met 
general description of suspects); R. v. Juan, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1402, 222 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at paras. 
22-28 (B.C.C.A.) (passengers detained following police take-down of a significant cocaine 
transaction; police evidence accepted that ordinarily in high-level commercial drug transactions, 
principals do not take “innocents” along but rather persons as holders, protection and lookouts who 
are therefore prima facie complicit in the criminality). 
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not always comfortably apparent when objectively viewed.71 On occasion, 
the question of the constitutionality of a passenger’s detention engages 
discussion of a security detention incidental to a stop and detention of 
the driver and vehicle.72 
III. INCIDENTAL AUTHORITY TO SEARCH DETAINEE 
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.73 On the occasion 
of an investigative detention, a police officer may execute a limited 
search of the detainee. This may be essential for police safety in a close 
encounter with an individual suspected of involvement in crime.74 The 
                                                                                                            
71
 A. Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause – Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 
52 Crim. L.Q. 327, at 341 (“Routinely officers demand identification from passengers . . . without 
cause”); R. v. Chaisson, [2006] S.C.J. No. 11, 206 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) (revg [2005] N.J. No. 277, 
200 C.C.C. (3d) 494 (N.L.C.A.)) (passenger ordered out of vehicle after driver apparently stuffing 
something under vehicle seat); R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) 
(passenger detained on speculation that vehicle was an illicit drug conveyance); R. v. Cooper, 
[2005] N.S.J. No. 102, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 162, at paras. 34-46 (N.S.C.A.) (officer’s habit was to stop 
vehicle, “check parties” by taking names and “check[ing] them for warrants and CPIC. . . Just a 
general compliance”; passenger found to be lawfully detained after he fled from a traffic stop as under 
provincial highway legislation police are entitled to question front seat passengers with “a newly 
licenced driver” and therefore action of passenger consisting of act of obstruction).  
72
 R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R. (6th) 220 (Ont. C.A.) (traffic stop for failure 
to signal left turn, officer asked for identification from all occupants of vehicle including H. on 
officer’s evidence as “just a . . . routine investigation” to see “[i]f there is anything pertinent or 
anything important that these three parties will have on them or this vehicle that could involve . . . 
anything from probations to recognizance, whether the vehicle was stolen or not, to numerous types 
of other information, it allows us to act as police officers and enforce the laws” [at para. 8]; CPIC 
check revealed H. on bail with curfew condition of which he was in breach; H. arrested for bail 
breach and cocaine discovered on his person; in circumstances, H. detained in vehicle once told to 
keep hands in open view; here officer took “reasonable steps . . . to assume control of the occupants 
of the vehicle” [at para. 27], H.’s detention not arbitrary including after he was asked for his 
identification, a request which “did not prolong or alter the nature” [at para. 26] of H.’s detention; 
request for H.’s identification, though, amounting to unreasonable search breaching s. 8 of Charter). 
73
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 324 (S.C.C.); R. v. Buhay, 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 112 (S.C.C.); R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, 104 C.C.C. 
(3d) 23, at 34 (S.C.C.). 
74
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 41 (S.C.C.), the Court 
specifically notes the “stop and frisk” Terry origin of investigative detention and the authority for 
an incidental search where officer believes he or she is dealing with “an armed and dangerous 
individual” (emphasis added). The U.S. courts have maintained adherence to the “armed and dangerous” 
criteria: D.A. Harris, “Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized Suspicion, Categorical 
Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio” (1998)  
72 St. John’s L. Rev. 975; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, at 92-93 (1979) (“initial frisk of Ybarra 
was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous,  
a belief which this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for 
weapons”). Frequently, an officer must make “a quick decision as to how to protect himself . . . 
from possible danger”: R. v. Ferris, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1415, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 298, at 316 
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search power does not exist as a matter of course.75 The warrantless search 
is not strictly incidental to an investigative detention but will be authorized 
at common law if its purpose relates to officer safety, not discovery or 
preservation of evidence,76 and it is carried out in a reasonable manner. 
Such a protective search, limited to a pat-down or frisk search of the 
person,77 will be justified in the sense of reasonably necessary if, in the 
totality of the circumstances, the detaining officer “has reasonable grounds 
to believe” that his or her safety is at risk,78 or the safety of another party 
is at risk.79 The search must “be grounded in objectively discernible 
facts to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’ on the basis of irrelevant or  
discriminatory factors”.80 
In theory, a detained suspect can consent to an extended search for 
items other than weaponry where the criteria for a valid and informed 
consent exist. 
                                                                                                            
(B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.)). “[I]t would be unreasonable 
to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties”: Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 23.  
75
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 40 (S.C.C.). 
76
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 37, 41 (S.C.C.) (search 
incidental to lawful investigative detention not equivalent to broader scope of search incident to 
arrest; the authorized intrusion is “designed to locate weapons” (not evidence); R. c. Bitzanis, [2007] 
J.Q. no 12628, at paras. 5-6 (Que. C.A.)). On occasion, as in R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 
220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), in the context of detention relating to possession of a weapon, the 
protective search may also result in discovery of evidence relating to the initial complaint or reason 
for detention. But there is no “unrestricted power to search incidental to . . . discovering evidence of 
a crime”: R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at paras. 78-79 (Ont. C.A.). 
77
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 43, 45 (S.C.C.) (pat-down 
or “frisk search” the duration of which is “only a few seconds” considered relatively non-intrusive; 
pat-down search to be conducted reasonably). 
78
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 43, 45 (S.C.C.) 
(“[R]easonable grounds to believe”, stated in two separate paragraphs, is most comfortably equated 
to the reasonable grounds/reasonable and probable grounds standard. Pegged at this level, the threshold to 
conduct a protective search would be more onerous than the standard to invoke the investigative 
detention itself. A Crown application for a rehearing in Mann limited to clarification of the standard 
of belief relating to a search incidental to an investigative detention was dismissed by a panel of six 
judges without reasons (see note at [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 484 (S.C.C.)). 
79
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.) founds the protective 
search not only on police protection (“the interests of police officer safety” (at para. 37); police 
officer’s “own safety” (at paras. 40, 43, 45); “importance of ensuring officer safety” (at para. 43)) 
but also, without illustration or elaboration, the protection of others (“or the safety of others . . . is at risk” 
(at paras. 40, 45)). In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, at 373-74 (1993), the Court described 
the objective of a valid protective search extending to “bystanders”. 
80
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) (decision to 
search “cannot be justified on the basis of a vague or non-existent concern for safety, nor can the 
search be premised upon hunches or mere intuition” (at para. 40); need for “reasonable and specific 
inferences drawn from the known facts of the situation” (at para. 41)). 
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Prior to instituting an investigative detention, the police do not always 
possess information concerning the prospect of the detainee being armed.81 
In practice, it may be that the “reasonable grounds to believe” threshold 
for a search incidental to detention is a more strenuous standard in name 
than in application.82 
It is accepted that the rationale of a protective search is to search for 
a weapon or something that might be used as a weapon. While the first 
category, including guns and knives, is easy enough to understand,  
the “adaptable as a weapon” category affords considerable subjective 
interpretation to street officers. Does this latter category include such 
mundane items as keys? In such an instance, would an officer require 
reasonable belief (1) that the item is adaptable as a weapon and (2) that 
the detainee may utilize the item in that manner? 
The discretion to undertake a protective search of the person of the 
detainee has been extended by the courts to receptacles83 and vehicles.84 
                                                                                                            
81
 In addressing the lower American standard of reasonable suspicion applicable to frisk 
searches (Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, at 93 (1979)), S.A. Saltzburg, “Terry and the Fourth 
Amendment: Marvel or Mischief? Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine” (1998) 72 St. John’s 
L. Rev. 911, at 966, notes that, “One problem with reasonable suspicion as applied to frisks is that 
it assumes the police have the same ability to gather information relating to a frisk as to a stop and 
this assumption almost surely is false.” 
82
 A tension exists between a perception of objectively existing articulable facts referable 
to the particular detainee as opposed to categorical assessment or application of a presumption of 
armed dangerousness. In R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.), he was 
reasonably suspected of involvement in a recent break and enter. The court sanctioned the existence 
of reasonable grounds to believe the suspect ought to be the subject of a protective search on the 
basis of a “logical possibility” (at para. 48) that he could be “in possession of break-and-enter tools, 
which could be used as weapons”. This conclusion apparently assumes that unlawful entry was not 
secured by manually forcing an opening, the use of a rock at the scene or the kicking of a door, and 
that any entry device had not already been abandoned or dispossessed. Without explanation as to 
the nature of their contribution to reasonable grounds to believe Mann was armed, the Court added 
in terms of reasonable grounds for the search that the search by the two officers occurred after 
midnight at a time when no one else was in the area. D.A. Harris, “Terry and the Fourth Amendment: 
Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality 
Under Terry v. Ohio” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 975, at 1006 and footnotes 120-21, notes that in 
the United States, “[e]ven though burglars need not carry weapons to ply their trade, a number of 
courts have created an automatic frisk rule for all burglary cases on the rationale that burglars often 
carry screwdrivers and other tools that they could use as weapons.” In R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. 
No. 5071, at para. 185 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court held the search of the detainee justified in part on the 
officer’s decision to move the detainee in a police cruiser without a protective screen between the 
seats. An observation of considerable ambiguity, a bulge or bulkiness associated with a person’s 
appearance, has supported a search for a weapon incidental to investigative detention: R. v. Waniandy, 
[1995] A.J. No. 131, 162 A.R. 293, at para. 4 (Alta. C.A.); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 
at 111-12 (1977). 
83
 In R. v. Peters, [2007] A.J. No. 560, 2007 ABCA 181, at paras. 7-13 (Alta. C.A.), in the 
course of an investigative detention relating to suspected possession of a firearm, the police justifiably 
searched the detainee’s large knapsack twice for a firearm posing a threat, discovering drugs and related 
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As expected, a protective search of more than one person at the scene 
raises its own problems.85 
During a lawful search of a detainee, weapons unlawfully possessed 
are properly seized, as are any other items, whether evidence or those 
unlawfully possessed, discovered in the course of such a search. In other 
words, seizures are constitutionally acceptable not only where the search 
is reasonably necessary as a protective search based upon reasonable 
grounds but also where the search is reasonably conducted.86 
Since weapons or potential armaments are not generally openly worn 
or carried, the manner by which such items, or any derivatively discovered 
item of contraband or evidence, are lawfully seized by the authorities 
becomes important. A pat-down search is a tactile search as the searching 
officer explores the person of the detainee by touch. Until reasonable 
grounds exist to believe that an item, concealed on the detainee in the 
sense of not visible to the naked eye, may be a weapon, the officer is not 
                                                                                                            
paraphernalia in the process. Where a detainee separates himself from his knapsack, disclaiming 
any privacy interest in the receptacle, the knapsack is effectively abandoned precluding a s. 8 
challenge: R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 2007 ONCA 596, at paras. 70-71 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. 
Plummer, [2007] O.J. No. 2818, at para. 158 (Ont. S.C.J.) (search of bag); R. v. Tran, [2007] B.C.J. 
No. 2341, 2007 BCCA 491, at paras. 5, 9 (B.C.C.A.) (search of fanny pack for weapons). 
84
 In R. v. Batzer, [2005] O.J. No. 3929, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (Ont. C.A.), the officers 
decided to search a vehicle following a pat-down search of the occupants looking for a gun. In a 
second search of the vehicle, the police discovered cocaine and ecstasy in a zippered case in the 
glove compartment. At 336-37, on the particular facts of the case, the Court agreed that “the 
extended search” was unsupported by reasonable grounds. In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,  
at 374 (1993), the Court confirmed that “in the context of a roadside encounter, where police have 
reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to believe that a driver may be armed 
and dangerous, they may conduct a protective search for weapons not only of the driver’s person 
but also of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.” But see R. v. Johnson, [2007] O.J. No. 5099, 
at paras. 29-30 (Ont. S.C.J.) (where driver handcuffed, search of vehicle incident to detention 
unreasonable). 
85
 R. v. Parchment, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1281, 2007 BCCA 326, at paras. 4-11 (B.C.C.A.) 
(report of P. “and a blond” dealing drugs out of a white van; police surveillance observed apparent 
drug transaction conducted from white van by P., passenger “searched for weapons” and released); 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, at 218 (2000) (the second officer frisked the other two individuals at 
the bus stop in company of the suspect said to have a gun — persons “against whom no allegations 
had been made, and found nothing”); R. v. Peters, [2007] A.J. No. 560, 2007 ABCA 181, at para. 8 
(Alta. C.A.) (P. closely fit description of a man in hotel reported to have a gun; “The police officers 
were also searching another man who had been with the accused”); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 
at 91 (1979) (“a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity 
does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”). 
86
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 45 (S.C.C.). Also, in  
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 104 (S.C.C.), Binnie J. observed 
that “[i]f evidence of the crime emerges in the course of a valid pat-down search incidental to the 
detention for the purpose of police safety, the evidence will be admissible” [emphasis omitted]. Similarly, 
in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, at 373 (1993), the Court held that non-threatening 
contraband or evidence could be validly seized during a lawful protective search. 
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entitled to enter a suspect’s pocket.87 Intrusion beyond touch engages the 
plain-feel principle, a cousin and variation of the plain-view doctrine,88 
and has its own limitations.89 
                                                                                                            
87
 A pat-down search does not itself permit an officer searching in the detainee’s pockets 
from the inside. Where, however, the feel of the outline or contours of a concealed object by its 
shape, mass and hardness makes it immediately apparent that it is a weapon in the experience of the 
searcher, the officer may take steps to retrieve the item from its location for visual verification and 
seizure if necessary. In R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 49 (S.C.C.), 
the Court noted that the officer’s decision to enter Mann’s pocket, after feeling a soft object in the 
pat-down search, as “more intrusive” and “an unreasonable violation of the appellant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of his pockets”. In R. v. Calder, [2006] A.J. No. 1303, 213 C.C.C. 
(3d) 342, at 344, 346 (Alta. C.A.), the Court agreed that the officer’s search of the detainee’s 
pocket, undertaken on the stated belief the bulge might be a weapon, was unreasonable having 
regard to the size of the two cocaine spitballs discovered in the pocket. 
88
 A person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in things exposed to plain view: R. v. 
Boersma, [1994] S.C.J. No. 63, 31 C.R. (4th) 386, at 387 (S.C.C.). A “central” feature of the plain 
view doctrine is “a prior justification for the intrusion into the place” where the plain view occurred:  
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114 (S.C.C.); R. v. Longtin, [1983] O.J. 
No. 3011, 5 C.C.C. (3d) 12, at 16 (Ont. C.A.). As a general rule, a legitimate plain view seizure 
does not permit “an exploratory search to find other evidence”: R. v. Fawthrop, [2002] O.J. No. 2604, 
166 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 115 (Ont. C.A.) (approving R. v. Spindloe, [2001] S.J. No. 266, 154 C.C.C. (3d) 8, 
at 37 (Sask. C.A.). According to Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, at 374, 376 (1993) while 
recognizing “the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the sense of sight”, “the sense of 
touch is capable of revealing the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to support a seizure”. 
However, as noted at 378, where the officer squeezed, slid and otherwise manipulated the contents 
of the suspect’s pocket, he overstepped the bounds of a protective search leading to a general or 
evidentiary search. 
89
 J.A. Cecere, “Searches Woven From Terry Cloth: How The Plain Feel Doctrine Plus 
Terry Equals Pretextual Search” (1994), 36 B.C.L. Rev. 125 underlines the concern at 150, 152: 
The risk is great that the plain feel doctrine will lead to far more intrusive, if not 
pretextual, searches. 
. . . . . 
This fundamental premise fails for most items of contraband. The varying physical characteristics 
of contraband make it virtually impossible for an officer to immediately ascertain the 
criminal nature of the substance, given the more cursory treatment of a patdown search. 
Thus, in theory, Dickerson protects the individual because the Court requires an officer to 
have probable cause before seizing an object or conducting a more extensive search. In 
practice, however, an officer could not possibly gain probable cause from the mere touching 
of an object through clothing. Indeed, the viewing of an object of contraband will very often 
be insufficient to give rise to probable cause, because the illegal nature of the object may not 
be immediately apparent. Touching in the context of a protective search is inherently less 
reliable than viewing. While a law enforcement officer normally would view the contraband 
itself, he or she could only touch it through clothing. In addition, the identification of an 
object detected through the sense of touch is open to a wider range of interpretation than if 
detected through the sense of sight. Thus, …the plain feel doctrine in the context of a cursory 
patdown search has great potential for error. 
This potential for misinterpretation, along with a zealous police officer’s desire to 
establish probable cause to justify a seizure, will inevitably lead to more intrusive searches 
than permitted by Terry. Moreover, to approve the use of evidence of some offense unrelated 
to weapons would be to invite the use of weapon searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches, 
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A search incidental to a lawful arrest may, in some circumstances, 
precede the arrest itself.90 The danger exists of an officer cascading through 
a groundless investigative detention to an arrest supported only by 
information arising from the detention until after the arrest itself. Grounds 
for arrest arising from an unconstitutional investigative detention or from 
an unreasonable search incident to a lawful investigative detention cannot 
afford valid grounds for arrest.91 
IV. EXERCISE OF ADDITIONAL POWERS 
The exercise of investigatory duties by the police does not translate 
to a police officer’s powers being “unlimited”.92 The detaining officer 
seeks to quickly confirm or dispel her or his suspicions during a brief 
investigative detention. The primary investigative technique is questioning 
the detainee.93 
An officer’s questions to an individual investigatively detained may 
themselves amount to a warrantless search within a section 8 Charter 
context.94 
                                                                                                            
and thus to severely erode the protection of the Fourth Amendment. (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis of original) 
90
 R. v. Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 207 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dubois, 
[2004] B.C.J. No. 2426, 205 B.C.A.C. 156, at para. 10 (B.C.C.A.). 
91
 On occasion, an accused will argue that the police employed the “pretense of an investigative 
detention to search him for evidence to justify an arrest”: see, for example, R. v. Parchment, [2007] 
B.C.J. No. 1281, 2007 BCCA 326, at para. 36 (B.C.C.A.). 
92
 R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 120 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mann, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 324 (S.C.C.) (“Police powers and police duties are 
not necessarily correlative”; police are “not empowered to undertake any and all action in the 
exercise of that duty”); U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, at 714 (1983) (Terry stops “do not provide the 
police with a commission to employ whatever investigative techniques they deem appropriate”); 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, at 499 (1985) (“Nor may the police seek to verify their suspicions 
by means that approach the conditions of arrest”). 
93
 As noted in R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at 40 (Ont. C.A.) 
(leave to appeal granted [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)), “Persons who are detained for 
investigative purposes are usually questioned”; “Asking questions is an essential part of police 
investigations”: Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, at 185 (2004). 
94
 In R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 487-88, 490 (S.C.C.), 
the officer’s questions were “elements of a search” as they fell outside the scope of the lawful 
reason for the detention and were not based on reasonable and probable grounds leading to 
“compelled testimony” contravening s. 8. In R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482,  
at 506 (Ont. C.A.), the Court concluded that a search of the vehicle driver commenced “when the 
appellant was initially questioned by the police officer” in the absence of articulable cause for the 
detention. Similarly, in R. v. Young, [1997] O.J. No. 2431, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 350, at 358 (Ont. C.A.), 
the court held that the police questions of a detained suspect constituted an unreasonable search 
because the officer acted on a hunch or mere suspicion of the suspect’s involvement in a break and 
enter. In R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250, at 264-65 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to 
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appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99 (S.C.C.)), after noting that “[t]he divide between questions 
that begin a search and questions that do not is sometimes not easy to draw”, the Court observed 
that in R. v. Young, R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) and R. v. 
Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.) “when the police asked the crucial 
questions, they had already formed the intention to conduct a search, as evidenced by the specificity 
of the questions they asked”. The Court in Grant considered, in that case, that “the nature of the police’s 
question [“if he had anything he shouldn’t”] did not go that far and . . . was asked in quite a different 
context”. In R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at 556-57 (Alta. C.A.), the 
accused’s argument that police questioning constituted a search stumbled on the facts as R. was told 
he was free to go at any time. In R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R. (6th) 220 (Ont. C.A.), 
a majority of the Court found H. was subjected to a search within the scope of s. 8 when, as a 
passenger in a vehicle stopped by the police, not suspected of any wrongdoing, he was questioned. 
At paras. 34, 38-44, the Court stated: 
Answers to police questions may or may not give rise to a s. 8 claim. As with other 
aspects of the s. 8 inquiry, a fact-specific examination of the circumstances is necessary. 
Where the subject of the questioning is under police detention and reasonably believes that 
he or she is compelled to provide the information sought in the questions, I do not think it 
distorts the concept of a seizure to describe the receipt of the information by the police as a 
non-consensual taking of that information from the detained person. 
. . . . . 
. . . [I]n the present case, Harris was under police detention. Lipkus was not asking Harris to 
identify himself out of some sense of curiosity or so he could greet Harris by name should 
they meet again. Lipkus had a very specific purpose in mind when he asked for identification. 
He intended to use that identification to access a wealth of personal information about 
Harris before allowing Harris to proceed on his way. That information included whether Harris 
had a criminal record, was subject to any outstanding court orders and, if so, the terms of 
those orders. Although Crown counsel submits that the officer’s request for identification 
was “not directed at obtaining incriminating information in relation to unrelated criminal 
conduct”, I think that was precisely one of the reasons Lipkus asked Harris for identification. 
Why else would Lipkus use the identification to determine whether Harris was in breach of 
any outstanding court orders? 
Given the information readily available to Lipkus through CPIC, I see no functional 
difference between Lipkus asking Harris to identify himself and then checking that identification 
through CPIC, and Lipkus asking Harris a series of questions about his criminal past, his 
bail status, and the terms of any bail that Harris might be under. Lipkus’s immediate access 
to information available on CPIC made Lipkus’s request for identification the equivalent of 
Lipkus asking Harris whether he was breaching any court orders at that moment. 
A person under police detention who is being asked to incriminate himself has more 
than a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the answers to any questions that 
are put to him by the police. That person has a right to silence unless he or she makes an 
informed decision to waive that right and provide the requested information to the police:  
R. v. Hebert (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). In the circumstances, Harris’s identification 
in response to the officer’s question constitutes a seizure and attracts s. 8 protection.2 
2 Section 7 of the Charter was not argued. It may be that on these facts the appellant’s 
claim could be more easily assessed as a self-incrimination claim under s. 7. Whether 
the claim is made under s. 7, the broad description of an individual’s legal rights, or s. 8, 
one of the specific examples of those rights, the essentials are the same. Individuals are 
entitled to be left alone by the state absent justification for state interference. Could the 
state justify compelling Harris to provide information to an agent of the state to be used 
by that agent to investigate Harris? 
The seizure was unreasonable. As in Mellenthin, Lipkus had no reason to suspect Harris 
of anything when he questioned him and requested his identification. The purpose for the 
stop and the consequential detention of Harris and the other occupants of the vehicle had 
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A detained suspect is not obliged to respond to questioning.95 As a 
matter of common sense, a detained suspect is more likely than an 
undetained person to believe she or he is compelled to respond to police 
questioning. While the police are under no obligation to inform the 
detainee of his or her right to remain silent, there must be compliance 
with the section 10(a)96 and section 10(b)97 Charter rights. 
                                                                                                            
nothing to do with the request for Harris’s identification. The purpose of the stop did not 
justify an at large inquiry into Harris’s background or his status in the criminal justice system. 
That was the effect of the request for identification. Just as in Mellenthin, Lipkus expanded 
a Highway Traffic Act stop into a broader and unrelated inquiry. Harris’s identification of 
himself provided the entrée into that broader and unrelated inquiry. 
. . . . . 
Grafe and the other cases, however, turn largely on the finding that the person who was 
asked for identification was not under police detention or any other form of compulsion to 
answer the request for identification. If, as in this case, a request for identification is made 
in circumstances of detention in which the detained individual reasonably feels compelled 
to answer the request for identification, then the question assumes a coercive quality in the 
nature of a demand, which suggests a state seizure of the response: see Mellenthin, supra; 
R. v. Young (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 350 (Ont. C.A.). 
The Crown also relies on R. v. Grant (2006), 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250 at 264-65 (Ont. 
C.A.). Grant recognized that some questioning will constitute a search for the purposes of s. 
8 and other questioning will not. Laskin J.A. pointed out that the nature of the questions and 
the context in which those questions were asked are important considerations in determining 
whether the questions constituted a search. On his analysis, it was important to consider whether 
the question was, in the minds of the police, preliminary to a more detailed search. In the 
present case, when Lipkus asked for identification, he intended to use that identification to 
conduct a CPIC search, one of the purposes of which was to determine whether the appellant 
was under any court orders and in breach of any court orders. I think the officer’s intention 
to use Harris’s identification to make the various inquiries available through CPIC is akin to 
an intention to conduct a further more intrusive search after receiving the answer to the request 
for identification. Grant offers support for my conclusion that the request for identification 
in the circumstances of this case amounted to a search or seizure for the purposes of s. 8. 
I conclude that Harris was subject to a seizure when he gave Lipkus his identification. 
The seizure was warrantless and without reasonable cause. 
95
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 45 (S.C.C.); Hiibel v. 
Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, at 192-93 (2004) per Stevens J. (dissenting in the result) 
(“It is a ‘settled principle’ that ‘the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily 
questions concerned unsolved crimes’ but ‘they have not right to compel them to answer’”). 
However, the driver of a vehicle is generally required to identify himself or herself by regulatory 
legislation: R. v. Moore, [1978] S.C.J. No. 82, 43 C.C.C. (2d) 83, at 86 (S.C.C.).  
96
 In R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 21 (S.C.C.), the Court 
stated that, “At a minimum, individuals who are detained for investigative purposes must therefore 
be advised, in clear and simple language, of the reasons for the detention”; R. v. Nguyen, [2008] 
O.J. No. 219, 2008 ONCA 49, at paras. 11-22 (Ont. C.A.) (here obligation of police to comply with 
s. 10(a) “easy to fill” — the officer could easily have said, “Police, stop, we’re investigating a 
marijuana grow op in this house” to driver of vehicle turning into driveway at time of execution of 
search warrant). In R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), the detainee 
was told there had been a gun complaint. In R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481 
(Ont. C.A.), the suspect was informed that he was under investigative detention for trafficking. In 
R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, at para. 182 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court observed: “J.A. Nicol,  
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In an investigative detention, the police officer is generally in an 
adversarial position vis-à-vis the detainee as the officer seeks confirmation 
that the suspect is the person involved in the subject criminality — in 
effect, making an effort to top up reasonable suspicion to reasonable 
grounds to make an arrest. There is, therefore, a situational incentive for 
the police to provide the suspect less, rather than more, information about 
the transaction under investigation as the investigator’s questions attempt 
to draw out information about the suspect’s recent whereabouts, association 
with others, route, etc., committing the detainee to an account for evaluation 
against the officer’s possessed and incoming information. 
A suspect who is detained within the meaning of section 10(b) must 
be given the right to counsel upon detention.98 Compliance with section 
10(b) “cannot be transformed into an excuse for prolonging, unduly and 
artificially, a detention that . . . must be of brief duration”.99 In some 
instances, the police may communicate the section 10(b) rights to a 
detained suspect at the outset of investigative detention with failure to 
                                                                                                            
‘“Stop in the Name of the Law”: Investigative Detention’ (2002), 7 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 223 at  
p. 244, in my view correctly observes that ‘in rapidly developing situations on the street, it would 
be unreasonable to expect police [to] provide the suspect with precise and comprehensive details as 
to why they are being detained’ . . . the primary benefit of the s. 10(a) communication [is] to permit 
an informed decision as to whether to exercise the s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel (R. v. Latimer, 
(1997), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.), at 205; R. v. Schmautz [[1990] S.C.J. No. 21, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 556 
(S.C.C.)] at p. 560 . . .”). Quite apart from providing appreciation of his or her jeopardy, in the 
words used to communicate the s. 10(a) right, it should be made clear that the officer is not simply 
chatting with the suspect but that he is detained and not free to leave until released: see A. Fiszauf, 
“Articulating Cause – Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327,  
at 336-37. Ambiguity in this regard will fail to alert the detainee to his or her predicament respecting 
escape, resistance, obstruction or assault and may well defeat prosecution. 
97
 In R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 22 (S.C.C.), a case where 
there was no communication of the s. 10(b) right, after noting that s. 10(b) must be purposively 
interpreted, the Court left to another day the question of the need for compliance with s. 10(b) 
during a brief investigative detention. In R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at 42 
(Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)), the Court held that a detainee 
is to be afforded his or her s. 10(b) Charter right after a “brief interlude” has passed since the invocation of 
investigative detention. In the United States, with Miranda [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] 
rights vesting on custodial detention, the counsel issue does not arise in the context of a stop and frisk. 
In R. v. Suberu, at 45, without deciding the issue, the Court raised the prospect of self-incriminatory 
statements of a detainee given prior to communication of the s. 10(b) Charter right being excluded, 
other than to explain subsequent police conduct, to prevent unfairness (“The force of that argument 
would depend on the entirety of the circumstances surrounding the detention and taking of the 
statements. Factors such as the nature of the detention, the kinds of questions asked, and the age of 
the detained person would be among the relevant considerations.” [at para. 61]). 
98
 R. v. Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 211-12 (S.C.C.); R. v. MacEachern, 
[2007] N.S.J. No. 245, 221 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at para. 19 (N.S.C.A.). 
99
  R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). 
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do so breaching the detainee’s right to counsel.100 Other authority has 
decided that a contextual and purposive application of section 10(b), and 
specifically the words of the text of the constitutional right, “without delay”, 
does not require a detaining officer to immediately communicate the 
right to counsel during the “brief interlude between the commencement of 
an investigative detention” and the cessation of the “brief”101 detention 
permitted in a Mann102 investigative detention.103 This approach, either 
through the interpretation of the “without delay” mandate of section 10(b), 
or perhaps at some point through a section 1 Charter justification, defers 
the section 10(b) right. Although the Court in Suberu104 recognized that 
                                                                                                            
100
 R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J. No. 376, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 28 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. 
Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305, at paras. 82-85 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal 
refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 522 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Campbell, [2003] M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 452, 
at paras. 44-52 (Man. C.A.). 
101
 R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to 
appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)) (delay of one-half hour “is beyond the limits of 
the ‘without delay’ requirement” [at para. 54]); R. v. Gurung, [2007] O.J. No. 4231, at paras. 25-29 
(Ont. S.C.J.) (55-minute roadside detention breaching s. 9 Charter right); R. v. Schrenk, [2007] M.J. 
No. 154, 2007 MBQB 93, at para. 27 (Man. Q.B.) (an eight-minute detention was “brief”). In R. v. 
Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071 (Ont. S.C.J.), on the issue of “brief” detention, the court stated at 
paras. 189-91: 
Beyond the admonition that an investigative detention must be “brief” to retain its 
constitutional status, the courts have declined bright line temporal rules: U.S. v. Place, at  
p. 709 (“we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation”; “we decline to adopt any 
outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop”); U.S. v. Sharpe, at p. 685 (per Burger C.J., 
“. . . our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops”; no outside limit of 20 min.; 
and at p. 697 per Marshall J., “. . . Terry’s brevity requirement is not judged by a stopwatch 
but rather by the facts of particular stops”). 
I agree with the observations of J.A. Nicol, “‘Stop in the Name of the Law’: Investigative 
Detention”, at p. 232 that “the facts will play a pivotal role in determining the flexibility of 
any temporal restrictions” including the seriousness and complexity of the crime(s) being 
investigated. Resort to caselaw examples is at best rough guidance as to the constitutionally 
tolerable duration of the temporary restraint of an investigative detention: R. v. Greaves,  
at pp. 324-7 (40-min. detention not violating s. 9 of the Charter); R. v. Willis, at para. 31 
(questioning for a few minutes was justifiable”); R. v. Scott (2005), 191 C.C.C. (3d) 183 
(N.S.C.A.) at paras. 6, 35 (leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 24) (approximate 
30-min. investigative detention not unreasonable); R. v. Dupuis, [1994] A.J. No. 1011 
(C.A.) at paras. 9-10 (1-hr. detention upheld; police may detain “for a reasonable duration of 
time”); U.S. Tavolacci, at p. 1427 (10-to-15 min. delay for canine to arrive not unreasonable). 
In assessing the permissible length of the detention, the court may “take into account 
whether the police diligently pursue[d] their investigation”: U.S. v. Place, at p. 709; U.S. v. 
Sharpe, at p. 687 (per Burger C.J., no “delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation” by 
the police). 
102
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.). 
103
 R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at paras. 41-42, 50-51 (Ont. C.A.) 
(leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Peters, [2007] A.J. No. 560,  
2007 ABCA 181, at para. 15 (Alta. C.A.). 
104
 R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal 
allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)). 
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at the conclusion of a “brief detention” “the officer will either have to 
release the individual or, if reasonable and probable grounds exist, arrest 
the individual”, as investigative detention “is not an arrest and cannot be 
treated as a de facto arrest by the police or by the courts”,105 the Court 
twice speaks of an officer not being obliged to communicate the section 
10(b) right while he or she makes up his or her mind whether “the detained 
person will be detained for something more than a brief interval.”106 It is 
unclear whether this latter language envisions a brief interval within a 
brief detention. 
Beyond the protective search of a detainee and the investigative 
technique of exploratory or accusatory questioning, police officers effecting 
investigative detention at times exercise other powers, some protective 
in nature,107 others investigatory.108 These powers ought not to be as 
                                                                                                            
105
 R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 40 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to 
appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)). 
106
 R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at paras. 50, 54 (Ont. C.A.) 
(leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)). 
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(1) illumination of vehicle interior — In R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, 76 C.C.C. 
(3d) 481, at 487 (S.C.C.), in the context of a check-stop program at night, the Court 
considered that an officer’s use of a flashlight was “necessarily incidental” to the lawful 
vehicle stop and occupants’ detention as “essential for the protection of those on duty”. 
(2) opening vehicle door — Vehicle stopped for speeding; driver unable to produce licence, 
insurance and vehicle registration when asked; driver claimed vehicle belonged to a 
friend; officer suspected vehicle might be stolen so ran computer check of plates; 
officer unsuccessfully searched glove compartment for ownership or registration; officer 
opened back door of stopped car to ask passenger to identify herself; held: the officer 
“had the right to open the back door and look into the rear of the vehicle for safety 
reasons and to speak with the passenger in the back seat” (R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405, at 421 (S.C.C.)). 
(3) direction to driver to exit vehicle — Vehicle stopped on account of expired licence 
plate; police intention to issue traffic summons; driver asked to step out of vehicle 
and produce owner’s card and operator’s licence; only when driver out and standing 
did officer have reason to suspect detainee armed; .38-calibre handgun seized in ensuing 
search; held: police direction to exit vehicle an “incremental intrusion” of a “de minimis” 
nature necessary out of “legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety” (Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, at 109-11 (1977)). See also R. v. Lal, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446, 
130 C.C.C. (3d) 413, at 418 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 
(S.C.C.)); R. v. Johnson, [2007] O.J. No. 5099, at para. 3 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Plummer, 
[2007] O.J. No. 2818, at para. 49 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
(4) direction regarding detainee’s hands — Commonly, the police direct a detainee to 
keep his or her hands clearly exposed during the investigative encounter (R. v. Clayton, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paras. 7, 10 (S.C.C.) — detainee 
instructed to turn around and place hands on top of car; R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 
49 C.R. (6th) 220, at paras. 20, 27 (Ont. C.A.) — occupants of stopped vehicle directed 
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to keep hands where officer could see them; R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. 
(3d) 250, at 254, 261-62 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99 
(S.C.C.)) — detainee pedestrian told to keep his hands in front of him); R. v. Tran, 
[2007] B.C.J. No. 2341, 2007 BCCA 491, at paras. 2, 9 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Iraheta, [2007] 
O.J. No. 2205, at paras. 30, 32 (Ont. S.C.J.) (show hands, direction to take hands out 
of pockets); R. v. Ismail, [2007] O.J. No. 3851, at paras. 6, 12 (Ont. S.C.J.) (order to 
remove hands from pockets); R. v. Williams, [2007] O.J. No. 4305, at paras. 9-10 
(Ont. S.C.J.) (detainee advised to keep hands out of pockets)). 
(5) physical restraint — Handcuffing of detainee (R. v. Parchment, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1281, 
2007 BCCA 326, at para. 10 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Batzer, [2005] O.J. No. 3929, 200 C.C.C. 
(3d) 330, at 336 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305, 
at 316, 327-28 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 522 (S.C.C.)); 
J.A. Nicol, “‘Stop in the Name of the Law’: Investigative Detention” (2002) 7 Can. 
Crim. L. Rev. 233 (having recognized authority to investigatively detain, it would be 
“unreasonable if police were not able to physically restrain a suspect if necessary”); 
R. v. Gurr, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1480, 2007 BCSC 979, at para. 28 (B.C.S.C.) (even if 
detainee handcuffed, pat-down search may not be inappropriate); R. v. Johnson, [2007] 
O.J. No. 5099, at paras. 20, 28 (Ont. S.C.J.) (perhaps handcuffs necessary)). 
(6) seizure of cell phone — During investigative detention detainee speaking on his cell 
phone saying to unknown third party that the police were present; officer seized cell 
phone; seizure justified to prevent detainee summoning “back -up forces”; police 
“were entitled to take preventative measures” (R. v. White, [2007] O.J. No. 1605, 2007 
ONCA 318, at paras. 39, 45, 47-49, 53 (Ont. C.A.)). 
(7) movement of detainee — Can police require detainee to sit in cruiser? (J. Stribopoulos, 
“The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention After Mann” 
(2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 309). 
(8) pursuit to detain — Where reasonable grounds to detain and suspect flees, police 
“had the right to pursue him” (R. v. Wainwright, [1999] O.J. No. 3539, at para. 1 
(Ont. C.A.)). 
(9) use of force — During an on-foot pursuit, the suspect attempted to conceal himself 
beneath a parked car; the officer was concerned that the suspect was armed and the 
officer was therefore disinclined to climb under the car; the officer elected to kick the 
prone suspect in the chest to gain control of the suspect; held: “application of situational 
force designed to dissolve a potential risk” to officer safety (R. v. Yum, [2001] A.J. 
No. 365, at paras. 4, 6-8 (Alta. C.A.)). 
(10) asking if weapon(s) present — Where police saw a knife, lawfully possessed and visible 
in the front seat of the vehicle, police asked a passenger whether there were other 
weapons in vehicle (R. v. Gurung, [2007] O.J. No. 4231, at para. 8 (Ont. S.C.J.)). 
(11) movement of clothing — In circumstances, detainee told to lift front of hoodie to 
expose waistband as weapons often concealed there (R. v. Williams, [2007] O.J. No. 4305 
at para. 10 (Ont. S.C.J.)). 
108
 Measures apparently incidental to investigative questioning include: 
(1) request for detainee’s identification — As noted at footnote 94, a detained suspect, 
other than a vehicle driver, cannot be compelled to identify himself or herself. It may 
be that a “stop and identify” legislative initiative as an adjunct to investigative detention 
would pass constitutional scrutiny (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 
177, at 182-89 (2004)). See also R. v. Ismail, [2007] O.J. No. 3851, at paras. 23-28, 
42-43 (Ont. S.C.J.) (where discrepancy between driver’s identification and police 
information as to registered owner, reasonable to ask driver for passenger’s name). 
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invasive as the circumstances of an arrest. Often the case law reporting 
the exercise of these ancillary powers is simply as part of the context or 
narrative of the facts, without any consideration of the appropriateness of 
their application or whether, beyond reasonableness, some threshold  
of belief must first exist before implementation of the particular measure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Experts will undoubtedly continue to debate whether the courts ought 
to have left the subject of investigative detention to Parliament. But 
whether or not the judiciary should have exercised common law authority 
                                                                                                            
(2) moving the detainee — suspect touched on elbow and directed to side of train station 
(R. v. MacEachern, [2007] N.S.J. No. 245, 221 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at para. 8 (N.S.C.A.)). 
In R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, at paras. 187-88 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court upheld a 
45-second cruiser ride back to the crime scene as tolerably incidental to an investigative 
detention:  
This minimal movement of the detainee is qualitatively different than transport to 
a police facility — conduct converting an investigative detention to unconstitutional 
detention: Florida v. Hayes [460 U.S. 491 (1985)], at p. 815. There is no per se 
prohibition of movement of a detainee provided it is necessary in the sense of 
rationally in furtherance of the objective of the detention itself: R. v. Lewis, 
(1998), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 190 (decision to move detainee from 
airport concourse to nearby private room “appropriate”); R. v. Elshaw (1989),  
70 C.R. (3d) 197 (B.C.C.A) at pp. 203-4 (reasonable to move detainee from park 
to rear of patrol wagon (rev’d on right to counsel issue (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 97 
(S.C.C.) with court stating at p. 126, “It may have been reasonable and necessary 
to place the accused in the patrol wagon”)); L.A. McCoy, “Some Answers from 
the Supreme Court on Investigative Detention . . . and Some More Questions” 
(2004), 49 C.L.Q. 268 at p. 276 (“. . . all but the most minimal transfers would 
defeat the goal of investigative detentions being brief and non-intrusive”); U.S. v. 
Place [462 U.S. 696 (1983)], at 715 (during the course of stop, “the suspect must 
not be moved or asked to move more than a short distance”); Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983) (per White J., safety and security concerns may justify 
“moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigative detention”); 
U.S. v. Sharpe [470 U.S. 675 (1985)], at p. 692 (per Marshall J., “A stop can be 
unduly intrusive if the individual is moved . . . more than a short distance”); U.S. 
v. Tavolacci [895 F.2d 1423 (2nd Cir. 1990)], (movement of detainee not 
unreasonable — “Nor does the change of location from the train to the platform 
entail a full-fledged arrest”). 
(3) subjecting detainee to identification procedure — Subjecting detained suspect to 
identification by eyewitnesses upheld in R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, at para. 
187 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“The identification procedure was essential to determining whether 
Mr. Aguirre was the intruder or whether the perimeter of police officers should 
remain active. Elimination of a detainee is an important aspect of a brief investigative 
detention: U.S. v. Place, [462 U.S. 696 (1983)], at 702 (action ‘that would quickly 
confirm or dispel the authorities’ suspicion’); U.S. v. Sharpe [470 U.S. 675 (1985)], at 
p. 686 per Burger C.J. (whether officer chose ‘a means of investigation that was 
likely to confirm or dispel . . . suspicions quickly’”). 
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to fashion such a power for the police, and despite the cogent arguments 
for and against the existence of such a power, investigative detention as 
a police power has survived transplantation from the United States. 
The courts have an established penchant for eschewing “bright-line” 
rules in favour of broad discretion applied contextually on a case-by-case 
basis and according to general guiding principles including the overarching 
requirements of Charter compliance.109 An advantage is that no case suffers 
an apparent arbitrary fate in the application of a one-size-fits-all rule 
which adequately covers the majority of situations faced by the police, 
but not all. 
However, pride in avoidance of bright-line rules is surely warranted 
only where the courts provide, as a surrogate, tolerable clarity and certainty 
in the law.110 Establishment of police powers which are uncertain or 
ambiguous risks greater injustice than implementation of a bright-line 
rule.111 
In street policing, officers need to make quick decisions and to 
remain responsive to changing information. In such a dynamic and fluid 
environment, a police officer needs to know and be able to apply clear 
                                                                                                            
109
 Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. 
(3d) 1, at para. 62 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance filed after leave to appeal granted [1999] 
S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)) (where competing interests in each situation, it is “difficult, if not impossible,  
to provide preformulated bright-line rules which appropriately maintain the balance between police 
powers and individual liberties”); R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250, at 257 
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99 (S.C.C.) (although “[b]right-line rules 
. . . have the advantage of certainty”, bright-line rules “ill-suited” to addressing the myriad of 
circumstances in police/citizen encounters). 
110
 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405, at 433 (S.C.C.) (La Forest J. 
dissenting in the result) (“The police are entitled to as clear a standard as possible so as to guide 
them in the performance of their . . . work”); R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 
at 30 (S.C.C.) (La Forest J. dissenting in the result) (police “need the clearest possible rules” in 
enforcement endeavours); J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative 
Detention After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 314 (on the subject of investigative detention 
and the public, the police, lawyers and judges, “All four constituencies desire clarity, albeit for 
different reasons”); Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 
131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 62 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance filed after leave to appeal 
granted [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)) (“clear and readily discernible rules governing the extent 
to which the police can interfere with individual liberties are most desirable”). 
111
 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405, at 433 (S.C.C.) (“a vague standard 
. . . offers almost no protection to the citizen from interference by the police”); R. v. Landry, [1986] 
S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 30 (S.C.C.) (problematic to provide the police “a very vague rule 
for action”); J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention 
After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 304 (uncertainty is incompatible with the stated goal of 
regulating investigative detention as a low-visibility encounter); A. Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause – 
Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327, at 336 (vague criteria for 
detention is troublesome for police acting in good faith in performance of their duties and vagueness 
inadvertently legitimizes many detentions as a practical matter). 
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rules almost automatically. There is no time to “grapple  . . . with 
complexities”112 in the law. Unfortunately, many of the limits relating to 
investigative detentions and related searches and field interrogations 
remain entirely uncertain. Granted, the characterization of detainees as 
warrantlessly seized may not achieve significantly enhanced clarity and 
fairness. But the approach should not be rejected out of hand. Indeed, if 
the courts do not soon achieve greater certainty respecting investigative 
detention, then the words of La Forest J. may, at some point, become a 
reality: “It would be an ironic reversal of roles if Parliament was required 
to act to protect . . . from possible excesses flowing from the application 
of a judicially created rule.”113 
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 J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention 
After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 314. 
113
 R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 31 (S.C.C.). 
